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COMMENT
FOLDING A LOSING HAND: WHY CONGRESS
SHOULD REPLACE THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET
GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT WITH A
REGULATORY SCHEME
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 23, 2003, the aptly-named, amateur poker player Chris Moneymaker won
the Main Event of the World Series of Poker and took home the first-place prize of $2.5
million.1 Moneymaker won his $10,000 entry fee to the tournament by winning a $39
satellite tournament on the poker website, Pokerstars.com.2 The next year at the Main
Event, hundreds of amateurs won entry to the tournament through low buy-in, online
satellite tournaments. 3 The number of entrants in the Main Event increased from 839 in
2003 to 2,576 in 2004.4 Yet another amateur, attorney Greg Raymer, won the 2004 Main
Event, bringing home an astonishing $5 million.5 The number of entrants into the Main
Event continued to rise with the number peaking at 8,773 in 2006.6 However, in 2007,
the number of entrants decreased to 6,358,7 the first Main Event since 1992 that fielded
1. Associated Press, Mr. Moneymaker Nets $2.5m Poker Prize, http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/West/05/24/
offbeat.poker.win.ap/ (May 24, 2003). Moneymaker's victory at the 2003 Main Event was improbable to say
the least, considering that all his previous poker experience had been online. Id. Since winning the 2003 Main
Event, Moneymaker has played the major poker tournament circuit with limited success, earning $291,622.
Card Player, Results for Chris Moneymaker, http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-players/1691-chris-
moneymaker (last updated Sept. 15, 2009).
2. PokerStars, Chris Moneymaker, http://www.pokerstars.com/team-pokerstars/chris-moneymaker/ (last
accessed Sept. 28, 2008).
3. Craig Tapscott, Online Poker Shoots and Scores with World Series of Poker Entries,
http://www.cardplayer.com/magazine/article/15511 (June 27, 2006) ("In 2003, PokerStars sent 33 players to
the WSOP main event; in 2004, 316 players ... [i]n 2004, PartyPoker gave away 250 seats").
4. World Series of Poker, World Series of Poker: 2003 Official Tournament Coverage and Results,
http://www.worldseriesofpoker.com/toumey/tournament-results.asp?tid=7&grid=5 (last accessed Sept. 28,
2008); World Series of Poker, World Series of Poker: 2004 Official Tournament Coverage and Results,
http://www.worldseriesofpoker.com/toumey/tournament-results.asp?tid=28&grid=23 (last accessed Sept. 28,
2008).
5. PokerStars, Greg Raymer, http://www.pokerstars.com/team-pokerstars/greg-raymer/ (last accessed
Sept. 28, 2008). Unlike the 2003 Main Event winner, Chris Moneymaker, Raymer's poker success has
continued, with net earnings since the 2004 Main Event totaling $927,666. Cardplayer, Results for Greg
Raymer, http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-players/4018-greg-raymer/overall/results (last updated May 31,
2009).
6. World Series of Poker, World Series of Poker: 2006 Official Tournament Coverage and Results,
http://www.worldseriesofpoker.com/tourney/tournament-results.asp?tid= 1141 &grid=146 (last accessed Sept.
28, 2008).
7. World Series of Poker, World Series of Poker: 2007 Official Tournament Coverage and Results,
http://www.worldseriesofpoker.com/tourney/tournament-results.asp?tid=3482&grid=309 (last accessed Sept.
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fewer players than the previous year. Poker commentators widely attributed this
decrease in participation to a single event: the passage of the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA). 9
While the UIGEA attempts to ban "unlawful Internet gambling," its efforts have
been largely unsuccessful.11 While some gambling websites no longer allow U.S. players
since the passage of the UIGEA, many sites continue to cater to U.S. players, taking the
position that the legislation does not apply to their websites.12 Despite the efforts of the
UIGEA, a U.S. gambler can establish an account with an Internet gambling company,
transfer funds to the site, and begin placing bets in a matter of minutes. 13 Because
Congress intended the UIGEA to effectively prohibit online gambling, no regulations
currently exist to ensure that players are adequately protected while using gambling
websites.14 For example, the websites that continue to operate in the U.S. use privately
held, foreign companies as e-wallets, which provide little recourse to U.S. players if
problems occur during the transaction. 15 The need for protection will only increase as the
popularity of Internet gambling continues to rise in the U.S.16 The UIGEA is an
ineffective method of dealing with Internet gambling and Congress should replace it with
a regulatory system modeled after the regulatory system employed by Great Britain. A
regulatory system effectively addresses the problems associated with Internet gambling:
underage gambling, problem gambling, money laundering, and fraud. Finally, the U.S.
could tax Internet gambling companies in exchange for a license, providing a much-
needed additional stream of revenue for the government.
This Comment examines the UIGEA, how other nations address Internet gambling,
and the benefits and disadvantages of implementing a regulatory scheme for Internet
gambling. Part II of this Comment examines how Internet gambling websites operated
prior to the passage of the UIGEA, the manner in which Congress passed the UIGEA,
the specific provisions of the UIGEA, and their effect on Internet gambling. It also
discusses Australia's attempt to prohibit Internet gambling. Finally, Part II presents two
28, 2008).
8. World Series of Poker, World Series of Poker: 1991 Official Tournament Coverage and Results,
http://www.worldseriesofpoker.com/tourney/toumament-results.asp?tid=2074&grid=207 (last accessed Sept.
28, 2008) (215 entrants); World Series of Poker, World Series of Poker: 1992 Official Tournament Coverage
and Results, http://www.worldseriesofpoker.com/tourney/toumament-results.asp?tid=2056&grid=206 (last
accessed Sept. 28, 2008) (201 entrants).
9. Associated Press, WSOP Entrants Down as Play Begins in Las Vegas,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/poker/news/storyid=2928413 (last updated July 7, 2007) ("It would mark the
first decrease in the number of entrants at the $10,000 buy-in main event since 1992 and was widely blamed on
a U.S. law signed by President Bush in October that cracks down on online gambling.").
10. 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
11. Chuck Blount, On Poker: Bet That Online Poker Finds Ways to Play, http://www.mysanantonio.com/
sports/MYSAl01 107_blount onpoker_en33f6cfchtml5327.html (posted Oct. 10, 2007) ("Despite the halt of
bank account transactions, it's still pretty easy to put money into online accounts.").
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367.
15. Gerd Alexander, Student Author, The US. on Tilt: Why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act Is a Bad Bet, 2008 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 6, 1 39.
16. Erica Warner, Feds Issue Rule Aimed at Internet Gambling Ban, http://ap.google.com/article/
ALeqM5gSosJ3yBl86H6_d8cUola3tZgCgAD94DNIAOO (Nov. 12, 2008) ("U.S. bettors have been estimated
to supply at least half the revenue of the $16 billion Internet gambling industry.").
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regulatory models: industry self-regulation and the United Kingdom's approach to
governmental regulation. Part III first analyzes the success of the UIGEA in prohibiting
Internet gambling. It then examines the justifications for prohibition and demonstrates
that regulation can address these concerns more effectively than prohibition. It will then
show that governmental regulation, loosely based upon the U.K.'s regulatory scheme, is
better suited to U.S. interests than industry self-regulation. Finally, this section will
examine obstacles that must be overcome in order for the U.S. government to regulate
Internet gambling. Part IV concludes that the UIGEA is an ineffective method of
addressing Internet gambling and that the U.S. should replace it with a regulatory
scheme.
II. BACKGROUND
A. How Internet Gambling Companies Operated Prior to the Passage of the UIGEA
Before the passage of the UIGEA, an online poker player, for example, would first
download the poker room's software and then create a user profile, consisting of basic
information such as name, address, and date of birth. 17 After creating a user profile, the
poker player would then provide funding. Prior to the passage of the UIGEA, "e-
wallets" were the method of choice for U.S. players. 19 An "e-wallet" is "an online
account in which money can be deposited and used in commercial transactions." 20 An e-
wallet can be linked to a player's checking account, credit card, or debit card. 2 1
B. The Manner in Which Congress Passed the UIGEA
The UIGEA passed through Congress as a rider to the Security and Accountability
for Every Port Act (Safe Port Act).22 Senator Patty Murray (D. Wash.) regarded the Safe
Port Act as necessary in order to "close a dangerous security gap and keep our country
safe." 23 The Safe Port Act provided $300 million in order to provide protection for U.S.
ports from possible terrorist attacks.24 Many members of Congress considered this bill a
"must-pass,"25 and it passed through the House with a 421-2 majority and through the
Senate with a unanimous 98-0 vote.26 Because there were differences between the House
and Senate versions of the bill, the bill then went to conference committee.27 It was at
this time that Senator Bill Frist (R. Tenn.) attached the UIGEA to the Safe Port Act.28
17. Alexander, supra n. 15, at 15.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id.
21. Id
22. I. Nelson Rose, Congress Makes Sausages, 11 Gaming L. Rev. 1, 1 (2007).
23. Bob Brewin, Senate Passes SAFE Port Act, http://fcw.com/articles/2006/09/15/senate-passes-safe-port-
act.aspx?sc lang-en kSept. 15, 2006).
24. Id.
25. Michelle Minton, Lawmakers: Rounders on the Hill, http://www.openmarket.org/2008/03/26/
lawmakers-rounders-on-the-hill/ (Mar. 26, 2008).
26. GovTrack.us, H.R. 4954 [109th]: SAFE Port Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-
4954 (last accessed Sept. 29, 2008).
27. Id
28. Rose, supra n. 22, at 1.
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Because a conference committee report is not subject to amendment, members of
Congress who opposed the UIGEA were in the unenviable position of having to choose
between voting against a vital port security bill or voting for it and allowing the UIGEA
to pass through Congress. 29 While some in Congress knew that the UlGEA had been
attached to the Safe Port Act, many claimed later that they had no idea that it was part of
the Safe Port Act. 3 0 After Congress passed the Safe Port Act, President George W. Bush
signed the bill into law, stating, "The [Safe] Port Act will make this nation more
prepared, more prosperous and more secure." 3 1 Notably, President Bush did not mention
the UIGEA or Internet gambling in his speech on the Safe Port Act.32
C. The Provisions of the UIGEA
The UIGEA is solely an enforcement statute; it does not prohibit any form of
gambling that is not illegal under some other state or federal regulation.33 Under the
UIGEA, "unlawful Internet gambling" means
to place, receive, or otherwise knowingly transmit a bet or wager by any means which
involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet where such bet or wager is unlawful under
any applicable Federal or State law in the State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is
initiated, received, or otherwise made.34
Thus, the UIGEA does not define unlawful Internet gambling, "but rather relies on the
underlying substantive Federal and State laws." 35 Another crucial aspect of the UIGEA
is that it does not make the act of placing a bet on a gambling website illegal. 36 As one
scholar notes, "[fjor a law designed to stop the flow of money, it is bizarre to make it a
crime only to receive the funds, but not to send them or transmit them: Neither the player
nor the intermediary can be charged with this crime." 37 The one felony created under the
UIGEA is for accepting a financial instrument for unlawful Internet gambling.38 A
person who violates this section of the UIGEA can be imprisoned for a maximum of 5
years, fined, or both. 39
Along with targeting Internet gambling companies, the UIGEA also seeks to
prevent financial institutions from transacting with the Internet gambling companies. 40
The UIGEA allows the Federal Reserve System, in consultation with the U.S. Attorney
General, to promulgate regulations requiring financial institutions "to identify and block
29. United States Senate, Senate Legislative Process, "Conference Committees," http://www.senate.gov/
legislative/common/briefing/Senate-legislative_process.htm (last accessed Sept. 29, 2008) ("Approval of the
conference report itself is subject to extended debate, but conference reports are not open to amendment.").
30. Rose, supra n. 22, at 1.
31. George W. Bush, Speech, President Bush Signs SAFE Port Act, (D.C., Oct. 13, 2006) (available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/10/20061013-2.htmi).
32. Id.
33. Rose, supra n. 22, at 1.
34. 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (10)(A).
35. 73 Fed. Reg. 69382, 69382 (Nov. 18, 2008).
36. 1. Nelson Rose, Viewpoint: The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, 10
Gaming L. Rev. 537, 539 (2006).
37. Id
38. 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
39. Id. at § 5366.
40. Id. at § 5364(a).
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or otherwise prevent or prohibit restricted transactions through the establishment of
policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and block or otherwise prevent
or prohibit the acceptance of restricted transactions."4 1 On October 4, 2007, the Federal
Reserve System, along with the Department of the Treasury, published proposed rules
designed to further the UIGEA's objective of prohibiting restricted transactions. 42 The
Federal Reserve System finalized these rules on Nov. 18, 2008 and they will become
effective on January 19, 2009, the last day of the Bush Administration. 43
The rules do not attempt to provide a more definitive definition of what gambling
activities are actually prohibited by the UIGEA:
The proposed rule does not specify which gambling activities or transactions are legal or
illegal because the Act itself defers to underlying State and Federal gambling laws in that
regard and determinations under those laws may depend on the facts of specific activities
44
or transactions.
Because neither the UIGEA nor the rules specify what gambling activities are
illegal, financial institutions must make those determinations for themselves.4 5 Many in
the banking industry opposed this imposition46 and declared that the industry will
respond to it by blocking all Internet gambling transactions, whether legal or illegal.4 7
The financial industry has strong incentive to take this approach because while a bank
could be fined for permitting an illegal transaction, the UIGEA exempts banks from
liability for blocking a legal transaction as long as the bank reasonably believed the
transaction was prohibited.4 8
While the rules do not mandate specific procedures for identifying unlawful
transactions, they do provide a "safe harbor" provision. 49 The safe harbor provision
41. Id.
42. 72 Fed. Reg. 56680, 56680 (Oct. 4, 2007); see Jason A. Miller, Don't Bet on This Legislation: The
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Places a Bigger Burden on Financial Institutions than Internet
Gambling, 12 N.C. Banking Inst. 185, 197-203 (providing an extensive discussion of the proposed rules).
43. Shari Geller, Govt. Issues Final Rule on UIGEA, http://www.pokerlistings.com/govt-issues-final-rule-
on-uigea-32748 (Nov. 13, 2008). Some poker commentators are hopeful that President-elect Barack Obama, an
avid poker player, will work to overturn these regulations. See Tim Shipman, US Election: Poker Player
Barack Obama Has Better Odds Than Dice Man John McCain, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
northamerica/usa/barackobama/article2252578.ece (last updated July 5, 2008) (quoting poker legend Doyle
Brunson: "Poker players have to support Obama ... God help the internet gambling business if McCain does
happen to win.").
44. 72 Fed. Reg. at 56681.
45. See Miller, supra n. 42, at 202.
46. Lori Tripoli, Commentators Criticize Proposed Regs' Clarity, Practicality, 12 Gaming L. Rev. 5, 6
(2008) (quoting a comment to the proposed rules made by Nessa Feddis and Richard R. Riese of the American
Bankers Association: "But the UIGEA takes banks beyond the role of reporting potentially or allegedly
illegitimate financial activity, and makes banks and other financial institutions, police, prosecutors, judges, and
executing marshals in place of real law enforcement officers when it comes to one of the most elusive of
modem crimes, namely, unlawful Internet gambling.").
47. Id. at 8 (quoting Francis Lee of U.S. Central, a federally chartered credit union: "However, the inability
to easily distinguish between Internet gambling transactions that are lawful and those that are unlawful places
financial transaction providers with a difficult choice. Because of the difficulty of determining what Internet
gambling transactions are lawful, it is likely that depository institutions will simply choose to refuse to do
business with persons who engage in Internet gambling transactions.").
48. 31 U.S.C. § 5364(d)(2); see also Tripoli, supra n. 46, at 6 (quoting Edward Leyden, president of the
Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming Association: "You can't get into trouble for blocking a transaction,
but you sure can for letting one through that somebody later down the line decides is unlawful.").
49. 73 Fed. Reg. at 69396.
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provides "non-exclusive examples of policies and procedures which would be deemed to
be reasonably designed to . . . prevent or prohibit unlawful Internet gambling
transactions within the meaning of the Act." 50 The procedures differ depending on the
type of financial institution involved. 51 For example, in order to receive safe harbor
protection, credit card companies must establish a number of procedures designed to
prohibit restricted transactions.52 These procedures include: establishing a screening
procedure in order to ascertain the nature of a merchant's business; monitoring a
merchant's website in order to detect unauthorized use; and imposing fines or denying
access to merchants who use the card system to process a restricted transaction. 53 The
Federal Reserve System estimates the cost to the financial industry for implementing
these procedures to be $88.5 million and an annual cost of maintaining the procedures to
be $3.3 million.54
While the rules place a duty on some financial institutions to prohibit restricted
transactions, many financial institutions are exempt from the regulations. 55 All
participants in the automatic clearing house, check clearing, and wire transfer systems
are exempt from the regulations unless they have a customer relationship with an Internet
gambling business. 56 The purpose of these exemptions is to ease the burden on the
financial industry, especially in regard to paper checks. 57 The financial industry
processes around 40 billion checks each year and it lacks an automated system to
determine to whom a paper check is made. 58 If the government required the financial
industry to ensure that it did not facilitate transactions between gamblers and Internet
gambling companies through the use of paper checks, it would cost the industry billions
of dollars.59 However, by exempting paper checks from the regulations, the Federal
Reserve System created an easy method for Internet gambling companies to avoid the
industry's attempt to "identify and block ... restricted transactions." 60
D. The UIGEA's Effect on Internet Gambling
Soon after President Bush signed the UIGEA into law, several Internet gambling
companies announced that they would no longer provide services to customers located in
the U.S.61 The largest and most successful company to pull out of the U.S. market was
PartyGaming.62 PartyGaming is a publicly traded company on the U.K. stock
50. Id.
51. Id. at 69409.
52. Id. at 69410.
53. Id.
54. 73 Fed. Reg. at 69397.
55. Id. at 69408-69409.
56. Id. at 69388.
57. See 1. Nelson Rose, Regulators Punt on Proposed Internet Gaming Regulations, 12 Gaming L. Rev. 1,
3 (2008).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 73 Fed. Reg. at 69409.
61. See e.g. Bob Pajich, PartyPoker Still Recovering from UIGEA, http://www.cardplayer.com/poker-
news/5336-partypoker-still-recovering-from-uigea (Oct. 21, 2008).
62. Id.
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exchange.63 Prior to the passage of the UIGEA, PartyGaming derived 77% of its revenue
from U.S. players. 64 After it announced that it would no longer allow U.S. players to
gamble on its websites, the company's stock plummeted 57%.65
While PartyGaming's withdrawal from the U.S. market represented a victory for
Internet gambling prohibitionists, competing Internet gambling companies soon filled the
void left by PartyGaming.66 As PartyGaming took the position that the UIGEA
prohibited its continued operation in the U.S., privately held companies, such as
PokerStars and Full Tilt Poker, announced that they would continue to cater to U.S.
players, in spite of the UIGEA.67 Soon after PartyGaming's withdrawal, PokerStars's
site traffic increased 24% and Full Tilt Poker's site traffic increased 50%.68 Thus, while
the UIGEA has been effective in prohibiting publicly held companies from operating in
the U.S., it has been unable to stop privately held companies from providing gambling
services to U.S. players. 69
The phenomenon of privately held companies replacing publicly traded companies
has also occurred in the e-wallet industry. For example, before Congress passed the
UIGEA, Neteller, a publicly traded company on the London Stock Exchange Alternative
Investment Market, 7 1 provided payment processing services to 80% of all online
casinos. 72 In 2005 alone, the company processed over $7 billion in transactions. 7 3
However, after the passage of the UIGEA, Neteller pulled out of the U.S. market, which
had provided 75% of the company's revenue. 74 Soon after, Neteller's stock prices
plunged to £128 from a high of E919.50.75
Because Neteller and other reputable e-wallet companies no longer operate in the
U.S., U.S. players who continue to gamble online face limited funding options. For
example, PokerStars provides twelve payment methods and nine cashout methods for
players residing in the United Kingdom.7 7 These methods include prominent companies
63. Multileveler, WhichPoker.com Figures Show Exact Effect of UIGEA on Online Poker Rooms, Party
Poker and Poker Stars, http://www.multileveler.com/PressReleases/releasel2408.php (Dec. 8, 2006).
64. Aaron Todd, PartyPoker Mucks U.S. Hand, http://www.casinocitytimes.com/news/
article.cfin?contentlD=1 61766 (Oct. 13, 2006).
65. Alexander, supra n. 15, at 1 34.
66. Multileveler, supra n. 63.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Alexander, supra n. 15, at 1 39.
71. PokerPages, Neteller Shares in Restoration of Trading on Alternative Investment Market,
http://www.pokerpages.com/poker-news/news/neteller-shares-in-restoration-of-trading-on-altemative-
investment-market-29884.htm (July 26, 2007).
72. Burke Hansen, Gambling Enabler Neteller Craps Out, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/01/17/
neteller _founders arrested/ (Jan. 17, 2007).
73. Id.
74. Vin Narayanan, Neteller Founders Charged with Money Laundering,
http://vinnarayanan.casinocitytimes.com/articles/35450.html (Jan. 16, 2007).
75. NEOVIA Financial, Share Price, http://www.neovia.com/content/en/investors-shareprice.htm (last
accessed Oct. 29, 2009).
76. Alexander, supra n. 15, at % 39-40.
77. PokerStars, Playing with Real Money, http://www.pokerstars.com/poker/real-money/ (last accessed
Nov. 10, 2008).
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such as Neteller, Click2Pay, and ClickandBuy.7 8 With these methods, a U.K. pla'yer can
make an instant deposit and have funds available from a cashout within one business
day. 79 Conversely, PokerStars provides five payment methods but only one cashout
method for U.S. players.80 While U.S. players can make an instant deposit with an e-
check, they will have to wait up to fifteen days to receive funds from a cashout via a
paper check.81 These examples demonstrate that Internet gambling is still readily
available in the U.S. because companies that have withdrawn from the U.S. market have
been replaced by companies that either believe that the UIGEA is unenforceable or
believe that the UIGEA does not apply to their business. 82
E. Does the UIGEA Apply to Internet Poker?
While the UIGEA attempts to prohibit online casinos, some online poker rooms
claim that they are exempt from the UIGEA because poker is predominantly a skill
game.83 Soon after Congress passed the UIGEA, PokerStars management issued a
statement that the site would continue to operate in the U.S., maintaining that poker is a
game of skill and, therefore, the UIGEA did not "alter the U.S. legal situation with
respect to [its] offering of online poker games."84 PokerStars's position is based upon the
traditional tripartite division of gaming. 85 Some games are pure chance games, such as
roulette, while others are pure skill, such as chess or checkers.86 Finally, some games,
such as poker, are hybrid games that have elements of both skill and chance. The
determination of whether poker is a game of skill or chance is critical because many
states prohibit wagers only on games of chance.88
The traditional test for determining whether a game is a game of skill or chance is
the predominance test, which focuses on which aspect of the game, skill or chance,
predominates over the other.89 In Joker Club, L.L.C v. Hardin, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals applied the predominance test to poker.90 In Joker Club, the plaintiff wished
to open a poker club and sought the Durham County District Attorney's opinion
regarding the legality of poker in North Carolina. 9 1 When the District Attorney replied
that poker was an illegal game of chance, the plaintiff then sued the District Attorney,
seeking a declaratory judgment that poker is a game of skill and thus not subject to North
78. Id.
79. See e.g. Neteller, Withdrawals, http://public.neteller.com/content/enUS/serviceswithdrawals.htm (last
accessed Oct. 29, 2009).
80. PokerStars, supra n. 77.
81. PokerStars, Receiving Checks from PokerStars, http://www.pokerstars.com/poker/real-money/checks/
(last accessed Oct. 29, 2009).
82. See e.g. PokerStars, Pokersiars.com-Our Business Continues As Before, http://www.pokerstars.coml
legislation/uigea/ (last accessed October 29, 2009).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Alexander, supra n. 15, at 126.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Joker Club, L.L.C. v. Hardin, 643 S.E.2d 626, 628-631 (N.C. App. 2007).
91. Id. at 627.
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Carolina's gambling statute, which prohibits wagers on "[games] of chance."92 The
district court ruled that poker was a game of chance and therefore illegal under the
statute. 93
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that although poker involved chance, skill
predominated. 94 The plaintiff called four individuals involved in the poker industry: two
professional poker players, a poker tournament consultant, and a casino manager.95 The
witnesses testified that a poker player needed the following skills in order to be
successful: patience, strong memory, ability to analyze odds, ability to "read" people,
and self-control.96 The plaintiff also argued that while a novice could beat a professional
poker player in a single hand, the professional would win over an extended session.97
The plaintiff compared this to an amateur playing a round of golf with Tiger Woods. 98
The amateur may win a single hole, but Woods would win the round. 99 In response, the
defendant argued that chance was the predominating factor in poker and called one
witness, a North Carolina Alcohol Law Enforcement officer, who testified that, based
upon his thirty-nine years of playing poker, it was his opinion that chance predominated
over skill. 100 The North Carolina Court of Appeals, applying the predominance test,
agreed with the defendant and held that chance predominated over skill in poker. 10 1 The
court reasoned that poker differed from games, such as billiards, golf, and bowling,
where skill is the predominant factor; "[w]hereas in poker, a skilled player may give
himself a statistical advantage but is always subject to defeat at the turn of a card, an
instrumentality beyond his control." 1 02 As the court adroitly stated, "No amount of skill
can change a deuce into an ace."l03
The UIGEA proscribes a person "engaged in the business of betting or wagering"
from knowingly accepting funds from another person in connection with unlawful
Internet gambling.104 The statute defines a bet or wager as "the staking or risking by any
person of something of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event,
or a game subject to chance." 10 5 Therefore, the use of the term "subject to chance" may
indicate a rejection of the predominance test and the application of the UIGEA to all
games that have any element of chance.106 Thus, regardless of whether skill
predominates over chance in poker, it seems that the UIGEA applies to poker, as long as
poker involves some element of chance. 10 7 While some poker players assert that poker is
92. Id at 627-628.
93. Id. at 627.
94. Id. at 628-629.
95. Joker Club, 643 S.E.2d at 629.
96. Id
97. Id.
98. Id at 630.
99. Id.
100. Joker Club, 643 S.E.2d at 629.
101. Id. at 631.
102. Id. at 630-631.
103. Id. at 630.
104. 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
105. Id. at § 5362.
106. See Alexander, supra n. 15, at T 27.
107. Id
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purely a game of skill, this appears to be an untenable position that a court would likely
reject.108 Because of this, this Comment will proceed on the assumption that the UIGEA
applies to Internet poker.
F. Australia's Attempt to Prohibit Internet Gambling
Australia's Interactive Gambling Act of 2001 provides an example of an attempt to
prohibit Internet gambling.109 Australians have traditionally been quite fond of
gambling,"l0 and so it should come as no surprise that Internet gambling has been
popular in Australia. Ill
Australia first responded to Internet gambling through regulation.112 In Australia,
like the U.S., regulation of gambling is left to the states and territories. 113 In March
2000, there were fourteen licensed online gambling operators which were regulated by
various state and territory gaming authorities. 114 Because of these regulations, Australia
became an early leader in online gambling."l 5 For example, Lasseters Online was the
first regulated online casino and was the first online casino to be operated by a land-
based casino.116 In 2000, Lasseters's clientele was 86% international, with 161 different
countries represented.' 17 Lasseters claimed that one of its best selling points to
international customers was its regulation by the Northern Territory government. 1 18
Also, in 2000, the Australian Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies
released a report, entitled Netbets, on the proper governmental response to online
gambling.11 9 The committee recognized that Internet gambling held the potential to
exacerbate problem gambling.120 While the committee considered prohibition of online
gambling to prevent problem gambling, it ultimately concluded that "a national
prohibition is not the best policy option for preventing an increase in problem
108. Neil King, Jr., Harvard Ponders Just What It Takes to Excel at Poker, http://theppa.org/headlines/
2007/05/03/harvard-ponders-just-what-it-takes-to-excel-at-poker/ (May 3, 2007) (citing Howard Lederer's
reasoning as to why poker is a skill game: "The 'vast majority' of high-betting poker hands ... are decided
after all players except the winner have folded. So if no one shows his cards . . . can you legally argue that the
outcome was determined by luck?").
109. Interactive Gambling Act 2001 (Cth) (available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legislation/
ActCompilationl.nsf/0/a9addc00214ecf6bca25702600029eeb/Sfile/interactgamb200lwd02.pdf).
110. Austrl. Parliament Sen. Select Comm. on Info. Tech., Netbets: A Review of Online Gambling in
Australia 2.1 (Sen. Prtg. Unit 2000) (available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/Committee/it-ctte/
completed inquiries/1999-02/gambling/report/cO2.pdf) [hereinafter Netbets] ("We are a gambling nation. We
will bet on anything .... We cannot watch two people playing any sport without saying 'I bet he misses.' ").
I 11. Austrl. Gov. Dept. of Commun., Review of the Operation of the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 22
(Austrl. Gov. Dept. of Commun. 2004) (available at http://www.archive.dbcde.gov.auldata/assets/pdf file/
0015/10950/Review of the Operation oftheInteractiveGamblingAct 2001 Report.pdf) [hereinafter IGA
Review] (citing a Nielsens Netstudy finding that up to 700,000 Australians participated in Internet gambling in
2002).
112. Netbets, supra n. I10, at 1.2.
113. Id. at 2.38.
114. Id. at 2.10.
115. Id. at 1.14-1.15.
116. Id. at 2.14.
117. Netbets, supra n. I 10, at 2.20.
118. Id.
119. Id at 1.4.
120. Id. at 1.3.
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gambling."1 2 1
However, soon after the release of the Netbets report, the Australian federal
government started to move away from regulation and towards prohibition of Internet
gambling.122 First, in August 2000, the government passed a bill which placed a year-
long moratorium on the development of the Internet gambling industry.123 During the
moratorium, the government released a report concluding that it was technically feasible
to prohibit Internet gambling.124 On July 11, 2001, the Interactive Gambling Act 2001
(IGA) became law. 125 The IGA makes it a crime "to provide interactive gambling
services to customers physically located in Australia."l26 Notably, under the IGA, an
Internet gambling provider can legally base its operation in Australia as long as it does
not cater to Australians.127 Furthermore, it is not a crime under the IGA for an Australian
to use a foreign Internet gambling provider.128 The Northern Territory government has
noted a curious paradox in this partial prohibition:
As Australian gambling operators will have access to a world market, excluding Australia,
they will be providing the other citizens of the world leading player protection and harm
minimization measures whilst Australian residents, who will have access only to non-
Australian operators, will not have anywhere near the same standard of player protection
and harm minimization measures. As a result of this there is a real likelihood that the scope
for problem gambling in this country will be expanded, not limited.12 9
Thus, by preventing Australians from accessing sites regulated by the government, the
IGA may actually increase the number of problem gamblers in Australia. 130
G. Self-Regulation by the Internet Gambling Industry
Two alternatives to the prohibition attempted by Congress through the UIGEA are
self-regulation by the Internet gaming industryl31 and government regulation. 132
Proponents of self-regulation argue that it is the most effective means of regulating
Internet gambling because: (1) regulations enacted by individual countries have not kept
pace with new technologies and attitudes; (2) even when a sovereign promulgates
modern regulations, issues of enforcement and jurisdiction remain; (3) zealous
enforcement campaigns by individual nations are only effective against responsible and
respectable establishments; and (4) self-regulation would allow the reputable companies
to succeed and disreputable companies to fail through market forces and watchdog
121. Id. at 1.27.
122. Andrew Essa, Student Author, The Prohibition of Online Casinos in Australia: Is It Working? 4
Queensland U. Tech. L. & Just. J. 88, 97 (2004).
123. Id
124. IGA Review, supra n. 111, at 3.
125. Id. at 4.
126. Id.
127. See Essa, supra n. 122, at 94.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting N. Terr. Gov. Submission to Commn. Info. Tech. and the Arts Legis. Comm., Austrl. Sen.).
130. See id. at 94.
131. Martin D. Owens, Jr., The Limits of Coercion and the Case for I-Gaming Self-Regulation, 12 Gaming
L. Rev. & Econ. 93, 93 (2008) ("Where the law is uncertain, there is no law.").
132. Dan W. Goldfine & Eric L. Kintner, The Case for Government Regulation of I-Gaming: A Counterpoint
to Owens's Advocacy of Self-Regulation, 12 Gaming L. Rev. & Econ. 101, 101 (2008).
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websites. 133
Self-regulation proponents argue that regulations enacted by individual nations
have not kept pace with new technologies and new attitudes towards gambling. 134
Before the advent of modem technological innovations such as high-speed Internet and
cellular telephones, gambling regulation was relatively easy because all the participants
needed to be in one physical location, e.g. a brick-and-mortar casino.135 Today, however,
"[e]very laptop and cell phone is now a potential business hub, retail center, music
station, or casino."l36 Changing social attitudes towards gambling may also reflect a
need for updated regulations. 137 When many gambling regulations were enacted,
legislators viewed gambling as "a social nuisance and a minor crime."l38 Today, 48
states have some type of legalized gambling and gambling is now seen as a legitimate,
multi-billion dollar entertainment industry.13 9
Self-regulation proponents also argue that the global nature of Internet gambling is
incapable of being regulated by a single sovereign.140 In an article supporting self-
regulation, attorney Martin D. Owens, Jr. cites three different methods in which a
sovereign can attempt to impose criminal liability on a foreign national living outside of
the sovereign's jurisdiction.141 First, a foreign national may voluntarily submit to the
sovereign's jurisdiction.142 This is unlikely to occur in most cases because the foreign
national can market and provide his Internet gambling operation to the citizens of the
sovereign without ever having to set foot within the jurisdiction of the sovereign.143 The
next method of imposing criminal liability on a foreign national is through extradition
treaties with other sovereigns. 144 While extradition is a seemingly plausible method of
arresting an Internet gambling operator, Owens argues that there are practical obstacles
to this method. 145 He argues that extradition is not intended as a day-to-day procedure
and that the political costs of a massive extradition would be prohibitive.146 The final
possible method is a unilateral extension of jurisdiction.147 However, this is an
extraordinary method which requires that "the activity complained of . .. be directly
harmful to the security of the moving nation."1 48 Considering that most nations that
attempt to ban online gambling allow other types of gambling, this standard would be
133. Owens, supra n. 131, at 93-101.
134. Id. at 94.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 94.
138. Owens, supra n. 131, at 94.
139. Id. at 95.
140. Id. at 96.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Owens, supra n. 131, at 96.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 97.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Owens, supra n. 131, at 97 (citing Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 402(3) (1987)).
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difficult, if not impossible, to prove.149
Owens goes on to argue that even when individual nations prosecute Internet
gambling, the effect is counterproductive to their stated goals. 150 For example, when a
government shuts down a high profile, publicly traded, transparent company, such as
Neteller, the result is often times that the reputable company is replaced by a company
that is more adept at evading government interference.1 5 1 These companies are usually
less concerned with fair dealing and consumer protection than their competitors.152
Therefore, by shutting down reputable companies, Owens argues that governments do
not stop Internet gambling, but rather degrade the quality of the businesses involved in
the practice.153
After enumerating the perceived difficulties associated with government regulation
of Internet gambling, Owens proposes two alternatives: (1) direct cooperation among
governments and private industry, and (2) self-regulation of the Internet gambling
industry. 154 As evidence of the success of the direct cooperation method, Owens points
to the horse racing industry. 155 The horse racing industry has set up a system where
gamblers in the U.S. and Canada can bet on races throughout the world. 156 Funds are
able to flow through this system in spite of jurisdictional differences in gambling
regulations and tax structures. 157
The second alternative Owens proposes is self-regulation of the Internet gambling
industry.158 While many have expressed concern over the lack of recourse a gambler has
if a foreign company fraudulently takes his money, Owens argues that the fierce
competitive nature of the Internet gambling industry remedies this situation.159 A myriad
of Internet gambling companies exist, and if one company is in the habit of defrauding
its customers, it should not expect to remain in business long.160 Furthermore,
information about disreputable companies is widely disseminated through Internet
gambling "watchdog" sites. 16 1 Owens ultimately concluded that the industry should
establish a self-governing body.162 The main functions of this governing body would be
"to oversee and influence the introduction of new technology, provide a reliable dispute
resolution forum, and compose a code of ethics."1 63 This governing body would be
sanctioned by the government in the jurisdictions in which it operates.164 This way,
Internet gambling companies would be taxed in exchange for a guarantee from the
149. Id.
150. Id
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Owens, supra n. 131, at 97.
154. Id. at 98.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Owens, supra n. 131, at 98.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 98-99.
161. Id. at 99.
162. Id.
163. Owens, supra n. 131, 100.
164. Id
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sovereign that the industry can use the state's financial institutions in order to fund the
sites. 165
H. Governmental Regulation ofInternet Gambling: The United Kingdom's Approach
Not all Internet gambling commentators share Owens's preference towards self-
regulation of the Internet gambling industry.166 In response to Owens's argument for
self-regulation, attorneys Dan W. Goldfine and Eric L. Kitner wrote an article extolling
the merits of government regulation of Internet gambling.167 Goldfine and Kitner argue
that instead of looking for jurisdictional loopholes around a sovereign's attempts to
regulate or prohibit Internet gambling, Internet gambling advocates should focus on
changing these regulations or prohibitions.168 While jurisdictional issues may exist,
these issues have not stopped government authorities from criminally prosecuting those
who violate existing laws concerning Internet gambling.169
As evidence of a successful national regulatory program, Goldfine and Kitner point
toward the United Kingdom's Gambling Act of 2005.170 As opposed to the covert
passage of the UIGEA, the Gambling Act was the product of six years of research into
the Internet gambling industry. 17 1 In 1999, an independent board reviewed the state of
the existing gambling regulations and made 176 recommendations, including the
implementation of a regulatory system for online gambling.172 After this report, the
government issued a report entitled A Safe Bet for Success. 173 A Safe Bet for Success
recognized that Britain's gambling laws had not been updated since the 1960s and had
not kept pace with technological innovations. 174 The report recognized that British
citizens already had access to overseas companies that provided Internet gambling. 175
Furthermore, it understood that "the prohibition of online gambling by British consumers
would be an entirely unrealistic objective, even if it were thought to be desirable."1 76
Because it found prohibition unattractive, the government advocated for the adoption of
a regulatory system for online gambling.1 77 The government also recognized that a strict
regulatory system would give British Internet gambling companies a competitive
165. Id.
166. Goldfine & Kintner, supra n. 132, at 101.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 102 ("In the last two years, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted Beton-Sports, an offshore
gambling business, and its officers for violating a number of federal laws relating to gaming, and indicted the
two founders of NETeller, an online payment services center, for laundering funds from online gaming."
(footnote omitted)).
170. Id. at 103.
171. Carl Rohsler & Katherine Conlon, An Analysis of the Chief Features of the Gambling Act 2005, 15 Ent.
L. Rev. 226, 227 (2005).
172. Gambling Rev. Body, Gambling Review Report 165 (2001) (available at http://www.culture.gov.uk/
images/publications/gamblingreviewchapter30.pdf).
173. See Rohsler & Conlon, supra n. 171, at 227.
174. Dept. for Culture, Media & Sport, Safe Bet for Success: Modernising Britain's Gambling Laws 6 (2002)
(available at http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/gamblingreportpgs.pdf) [hereinafter Safe Bet].
175. Id. at 22.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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advantage in the global market. 178 Based largely upon the recommendations found in A
Safe Bet for Success, the Gambling Act became law on April 8, 2005.179
Britain's Gambling Act legalizes, but also strictly regulates, Internet gambling. 180
In licensing Internet gambling, the U.K. government sought to achieve three purposes:
(a) preventing gambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being associated with
crime or disorder or being used to support crime,
(b) ensuring that gambling is conducted in a fair and open way, and
(c) protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by
gambling. 18
Furthermore, in order to prevent over-proliferation of Internet gambling
companies, the Gambling Act taxes Internet companies at 15%, the same rate as
traditional brick-and-mortar casinos.182 The Act also allows British residents to use
Internet gambling companies outside of the U.K.'s jurisdiction; however, these foreign
companies are subject to strict scrutiny by the Gambling Commission. 183
One of the primary purposes of the Gambling Act was to prevent minors from
accessing Internet gambling websites.184 With this in mind, the act creates a number of
offenses designed to protect minors. 185 First, a person commits a crime if he "invites,
causes or permits a child or young person to gamble.",186 Second, the act forbids a person
to invite a minor into a location that holds a casino license at a time when the location is
acting in reliance on the license. 187 The act also prevents a casino or other gambling
institution from employing minors; 188 however, a person may argue as an affirmative
defense to any of these violations that he "took all reasonable steps to determine the
individual's age, and he reasonably believed that the individual was not a [minor]." 1 89
Finally, the act places criminal liability on minors who gamble, enter the premises of a
gambling facility, or operate gambling facilities.190 Violators of these provisions are
subject to fines and up to 51 weeks imprisonment. 191
The Gambling Act also authorizes the Gambling Commission to create a code of
practice for licensed gaming establishments. 192 The code of practice requires licensees to
establish procedures that address problem gamblers. 193 First, licensees "must make
178. Id.
179. See Rohsler & Conlon, supra n. 171, at 227.
180. Goldfine & Kintner, supra n. 132, at 103.
181. Gambling Act 2005 pt. 1.1 (available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2005/pdf/
ukpga 20050019_en.pdf).
182. Goldfine & Kintner, supra n. 132, at 103.
183. Michael Blankenship, Student Author, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act: A Bad
Gambling Act? You Betcha! 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 485, 511-512 (2008).
184. See Gambling Act 2005 pt. 4.
185. Id.
186. Id. at pt. 4.46.
187. Id. at pt. 4.47.
188. Id. at pt. 4.51.
189. Gambling Act 2005 pt. 4.63.
190. Id. at pt. 4.48-4.50.
191. Id. at pt. 4.62.
192. Id. at pt. 2.24.
193. Gambling Commn., License Conditions and Codes of Practice: October 2008 31-37 (2008) (available
at http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/UploadDocs/publications/Document/LCCP%20June%202007.pdf).
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information readily available to their customers on how to gamble responsibly and how
to access information about ... problem gambling."1 94 The information must include
information concerning: (1) the availability of monitoring methods; (2) the availability of
timers; (3) self-exclusion options; and (4) the availability of further help or advice. 19 5
Next, licensees must establish policies and procedures for the purposes of identifying
problem gamblers.196 Finally, licensees must establish self-exclusion policies and
procedures. 197 Through self-exclusion, a gambler voluntarily places himself on a list of
individuals banned from a gambling establishment. 198 If the gambler attempts to gamble
again after the self-exclusion period ends, the licensee must provide a cooling off period
of at least one day before it accepts the gambler's funds. 199
One initial concern with the Gambling Act was that by legalizing and regulating
gambling, the number of participants would skyrocket; however, initial empirical
evidence suggests that the number of gamblers has remained static.200 A 2007 study
conducted by the National Centre for Social Research found that 68% of the adult
population in the U.K. participated in some sort of gambling activity in the past year,
while in 1999, the number was 72%.201 The study also found that only 3% of the
population gambled online,202 and that the number of problem gamblers, only 0.6% of
the total population, did not increase from 1999 to 2007.203 Tellingly, the percentage of
problem gamblers in the U.K. was lower than the percentage of problem gamblers in the
U.S. and Australia, nations that have attempted to prohibit Internet gambling. 204
III. ANALYSIS
A. Prohibition
The UIGEA fails to prohibit Internet gambling.205 Even a cursory search of the
Internet reveals dozens of gambling sites that continue to cater to U.S. players.20 6
Because most, if not all, of these companies are based overseas, it is very difficult to
enforce the provisions of the UIGEA. 20 7 Finally, because the UIGEA does not
194. Id. at 31.
195. Id. at 32.
196. Id. at 32-33.
197. Id. at 33.
198. See generally Gambling Commn., supra n. 193, at 33-37.
199. Id. at 37.
200. Natl. Ctr. for Soc. Research, British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2007 9 (available at
http://www.gamblingcommission.gov.uk/pdf/British%20Gambling%2Prevalence%2Survey/202007.pdf)
[hereinafter Gambling Survey].
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 10.
204. Id.
205. See Miller, supra n. 42, at 203-206.
206. See e.g. Bonus Geek, Online Casinos That Accept USA Players, http://www.bonusgeek.com/sites-
accepting-usa-players.htm (last accessed Oct. 26, 2009) (listing 30 sites including poker rooms, sports books,
and online bingo halls).
207. See James N. Brenner, Student Author, Betting on Success: Can the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act Help the United States Achieve Its Internet Gambling Policy Goals? 30 Hastings Commun. &
Ent. L.J. 109, 125 (2007) ("Because most of the offshore Internet casinos are companies that do not have
offices, employees, or financial assets in the United States, federal prosecutors may have problems establishing
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criminalize the act of placing a bet via an Internet gambling site, U.S. players continue to
gamble online without fear of criminal liability. 208
Some proponents of the UIGEA argue that it will successfully prohibit Internet
gambling once the regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve System are in
place;209 however, the exception made for paper checks will render these regulations
ineffective.210 Even if the regulations could block restricted transactions through all
other methods, Internet gambling companies could simply use paper checks to avoid
detection.211 In fact, PokerStars already sends payments to U.S. customers via paper
checks.212 While this method is slow compared to credit and debit card transactions,
Internet gambling companies will readily employ paper checks, rather than abandoning
the lucrative U.S. market.213 Therefore, the regulations place a multi-million dollar
burden on the financial industry214 in the midst of a financial crisis215 in order to
implement a scheme that will be unable to stop transactions between Internet gambling
companies and U.S. players. 2 16
While the UIGEA fails to stop Internet gambling, prohibition supporters maintain
that the only way to properly address Internet gambling is through a complete ban. 2 17
Proponents of prohibition argue that Internet gambling poses the following societal
problems: risk of addiction, underage gambling, money laundering, and fraud. 2 18
Prohibitionists argue that Internet gambling increases the risk of addiction because
players have continuous, convenient access to an online casino.219 They further argue
that it is much easier for minors to gamble online because a minor could easily establish
an account with his parent's credit card or bank account information.220 For example, in
a 2004 study, a 16 year old was able to register and play on 30 out of 37 gambling
extraterritorial jurisdiction over them.").
208. Congress's decision to not criminalize placing a bet online through the UIGEA stands in sharp contrast
to an earlier attempt to prohibit Internet gambling: The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999. H.R. 3125,
106th Cong. (Oct. 21, 1999). This act would have criminalized placing a bet online. Id. The punishment for a
violation of the act included a fine and the possibility of up to four years of imprisonment. Id.
209. See Ltr. from Sen. John Kyl & Rep. Spencer Bachus to U.S. Cong., Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act (April 24, 2008) (available at http://www.pokersource.com/news/kyl-bachus-pen-pro-uigea-
letter-congress.asp).
210. See Alexander, supra n. 15, at 1 32.
211. See id.
212. PokerStars, supra n. 77.
213. Conversations on poker message boards suggest that U.S. players are satisfied with this payment
method. See e.g. Two Plus Two Poker Forum, PokerStars Paper Check-Verification?
http://forumserver.twoplustwo.com/28/intemet-gambling/pokerstars-paper-check-verification-1 74425/ (last
accessed Oct. 29, 2009).
214. 73 Fed. Reg. at 69397.
215. See Associated Press, Administration Finalizing Internet Gambling Regs, http://www.iht.com/articles/
ap/2008/1 1/11 /americaflnternet-Gambling.php (Nov. 11, 2008) (quoting Rep. Barney Frank (D. Mass.): "This
midnight rulemaking will tie the hands of the new administration, burden the financial services industry at a
time of economic crisis and contradict the stated intent of the Financial Services Committee[.]").
216. See Miller, supra n. 42, at 203-206.
217. See e.g. Ltr. from Sen. John Kyl & Rep. Spencer Bachus to U.S. Cong., supra n. 209.
218. Katherine A. Valasek, Student Author, Winning the Jackpot: A Framework for Successful International
Regulation of Online Gambling and the Value of the Self-Regulating Entities, 2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 753, 760.
219. Id. at 762.
220. Id. at 764.
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sites.221 Also, money laundering is a concern with Internet gambling because an
individual could launder drug funds through a site by depositing the funds, making a few
bets, and then cashing out the funds so that they appear to be gambling winnings.222
Finally, prohibitionists are concerned that fraudulent Internet gambling sites could
withhold funds from a player or misrepresent the odds of winning a bet. 223
B. Regulation Can Effectively Address the Negative Aspects of Internet Gambling
While substantial problems accompany Internet gambling, some scholars and
analysts suggest that these problems could be more effectively addressed through
regulation rather than prohibition.224 Currently, the U.S. does not attempt to address
these specific concerns because it attempts to completely prohibit Internet gambling22 5
and it is unlikely to address these concerns as long as the UIGEA is in effect. 226 But
because the UIGEA fails to prohibit Internet gambling, the problems cited by opponents
of Internet gambling go unaddressed by the government.227 A regulatory scheme for
Internet gambling could address potential risks associated with Internet gambling in an
effective way while also providing an additional revenue base for the government. 228
1. Problem Gambling
Many Internet gambling sites already have procedures in place to address problem
gamblers. 229 Unlike traditional brick-and-mortar casinos, an online casino can easily
track the betting patterns of its patrons.230 Many sites limit the amount that can be
deposited on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis, and players have the option to reduce the
limits for their own accounts.231 Along with limiting deposits, many online casinos also
have exclusion procedures in place.232 For example, a poker player on Full Tilt Poker
can exclude himself from the site, either permanently or for a limited period up to ninety
days.233 The player's decision to exclude himself is irrevocable.234 Furthermore, a
player can also purchase software that can block access to all gambling websites.235
221. John Hand, Schoolgirl Tests Online Gambling, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uknews/3928261.stm (last
updated July 26, 2004). Because this study was conducted in the U.K. prior to the enactment of the Gambling
Act 2005, a new study should be conducted in order to gauge the success of the act in deterring Internet
gambling.
222. Valasek, supra n. 218, at 765.
223. Id. at 766.
224. See e.g. id at 784.
225. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367.
226. See generally Peter J. Scoolidge, Gambling Blindfolded: The Need for a Regulated Domain for
Gambling Web Sites, 10 Gaming L. Rev. 252, 252-253 (2006).
227. See Brenner, supra n. 207, at 133-134.
228. For a thorough examination of this assertion, see infra pt. Il(B)(l)-(4) and pt. Ill(C)(2).
229. See e.g. PokerStars, PokerStars Responsible Gaming, http://www.pokerstars.com/about/responsible-
gaming/ (last accessed Oct. 30, 2009); Full Tilt Poker, Responsible Gaming, http://www.filltiltpoker.com/
responsible-gaming (last accessed Oct. 30, 2009).
230. Valasek, supra n. 218, at 762.
231. See e.g. PokerStars, supra n. 229.
232. See e.g. Full Tilt Poker, supra n. 229.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See GamBlock, GamBlock: We Block Access to Online Gambling, http://www.gamblock.com/ (last
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A regulatory scheme could provide greater support to problem gamblers by
requiring all licensees to have similar deposit limits and self-exclusion procedures in
place.236 It could also require additional methods to protect problem gamblers.237 One
concern with current methods, like self-exclusion, is that they require the problem
gambler to recognize his addiction.238 Under a regulatory model, the government could
require a gambling site to automatically exclude players if they reach a certain limit. 239
Furthermore, the sites could share their decision to exclude with other sites so that they
could exclude the problem gambler as well. 240
2. Underage Gambling
A regulatory approach to Internet gambling could also address underage gambling
by requiring all Internet casinos to implement age detection procedures.241 Many sites
already have sophisticated detection methods in place. 242 Full Tilt Poker employs
Integrity Age Verification Services to ensure that its players are of legal age.243 This
service verifies age by cross referencing the data provided by the prospective player with
its database. 244 Integrity's database is derived from public information in 157 countries
and includes an individual's name, address, and date of birth.245 If a discrepancy exists
between the provided information and the database, an individual will be unable to
register on the gambling site.246 Parents can also prevent minors from accessing
gambling sites by installing filtering software, such as Net Nanny. 247
While age verifications methods such as Integrity ensure that the provided
information represents a person of legal gambling age, they cannot guarantee that the
person placing bets is actually who they represent themself to be.24 8 For example,
accessed Oct. 30, 2009).
236. This would be similar to the requirements that a brick-and-mortar casino would have to meet in order to
obtain a gambling license from states, like Nevada, that regulate gambling. See e.g. Programs to Address
Problem Gambling, Reg. 5, Operation of Gaming Estab. at § 5.170 (Nev. Gaming Commn. & St. Gaming
Control Bd. Mar. 31, 1999) (available at http://gaming.nv.gov/statsregs/reg5.pdf).
237. See e.g. Gambling Conmmn., supra n. 193, at 34-35.
238. See Nadine Nowatzki & Robert Williams, Casino Self-exclusion Programmes: A Review of the Issues,
http://74.125.95.104/search?q-cache:IxL2WTkEsUJ:gaming.uleth.ca/agri_downloads/973/Nowatzki.ppt+self
+exclusion+requires+a+problem+gambler+to+recognize&hl=en&ct--clnk&cd=1&gl=us (last accessed Nov.
13, 2008) (documenting the limitations of self-exclusion programs).
239. This requirement would be similar to regulations that forbid liquor licensees from serving an
intoxicated person. Cf Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 138, § 69 (2002).
240. This process already exists in regard to the dissemination of self-exclusion decisions. See Integrity, Self-
Exclusion List, http://integrity.aristotle.com/content/view/255/197/ (last accessed Nov. 13, 2008) ("Should an
individual whose name is on the [self-exclusion] list attempt to open an account with a participating gaming
site, Integrity would not return a match (approval) code to the merchant, thus blocking the user's access to the
site.").
241. See e.g. Gambling Commn., supra n. 193, at 27-34.
242. See e.g. Full Tilt Poker, supra n. 229.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Integrity, Cosmos, http://integrity.aristotle.com/index.php?option=com content&task-view&id=
1 13&Itemid=145 (last accessed Nov. 13, 2008).
246. See e.g. Full Tilt Poker, supra n. 229.
247. See Net Nanny, Net Nanny: Online Peace of Mindfor the People You Love, http://www.netnanny.com/
(last accessed Nov. 13, 2008).
248. See e.g. Integrity, Integrity: Direct, http://integrity.aistotle.com/content/view/47/197/ (last accessed
Nov. 13, 2008).
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Integrity's software would be unable to detect a child registering on a gambling website
with his parent's information. 24 9 While this loophole in the age verification methods
employed by Internet gambling sites is cause for concern, it is a risk that the U.S. accepts
in other areas that it regulates rather than prohibits.250 For example, thousands of minors
access traditional, brick-and-mortar casinos every year with the help of false
identification.251 Finally, the age verification systems currently employed by Internet
gambling sites have been successful in other regulated industries, such as online alcohol
sales.252
3. Money Laundering 253
Regulation can also help prevent criminals from using gambling sites as avenues
for money laundering.254 Under the current regime of attempted prohibition, some have
argued that the opportunity for money laundering is actually greater than under
regulation. 255 As noted above, the UIGEA drove many reputable e-wallet companies,
which have policies in place to prevent money laundering, out of the U.S. Internet
gambling market.256 For example, Neteller employs sophisticated identification methods
and reports activities that raise a suspicion of money laundering to the appropriate
249. See id; see also Severin Carrell, Children Using Debit Cards to Gamble Online,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/children-using-debit-cards-to-gamble-online-656035.html
(Mar. 31, 2002) ("Gamcare, a charity specializing in problem gambling, has seen a surge in cases where
children lied about their identities to register on Internet sites, and either used their own debit cards or stole
their parents.").
250. For example, minors frequently use "fake IDs" to obtain alcohol; however, states have responded to this
phenomenon by criminalizing the use of fake IDs, rather than prohibiting both minors and adults from
purchasing alcohol. See e.g. Elena Grimm, Out to Get 'em: Minors Watch Out, http://www.winona.edu/
winonan/s2007/1-31/Outtogetem.htm (last accessed Nov. 13, 2008) ("Eighteen percent of underage college
students use fake IDs to obtain alcohol, according to a Harvard study."); Alcohol Policy Info. Sys., False
Identification for Obtaining Alcohol, http://alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov/index.asp?SEC={E8988DID-B915-
4133-808E-23443EF43867}&Type=BASAPIS (last accessed Nov. 13, 2008) ("All States prohibit use of false
identification by minors to obtain alcohol.").
251. See B. Grant Stitt, David Giacopassi, & Margaret Vandiver, A Minor Concern? Underage Casino
Gambling and the Law, 37 Soc. Science J. 361, 363 (2000).
252. See Integrity, Case Study: Age Verification for Online Alcohol Sales, http://www.aristotle.com/
documents/OnlineWine Sales-WhitePaper2006.pdf (last accessed Nov. 13, 2008) (describing online wine
retailer Sherry-Lehmann's use of Integrity's age verification software in order to comply with regulations in
Massachusetts); see also Donna Leinwand, Teens Not Rushing Online to Buy Wine, Survey Shows,
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-08-09-survey-online-alcohol_x.htm (Aug. 9, 2006) ("A year after
the Supreme Court made it easier for wineries to ship products to customers in a different state, a new survey
indicates that teens haven't necessarily rushed to use the Internet to buy alcohol, as critics of the court's
decision have feared. The survey . . . found that 2% of youths ages 14-20 reported having purchased alcohol
online, and that 12% reported having a friend who had ordered alcohol online.").
253. Considering that the characters from Office Space were unfamiliar with what money laundering actually
entails, it may be helpful to provide the definition here. See Office Space (20th Century Fox 1999) (motion
picture) ("I can't believe what a bunch of nerds we are. We're looking up 'money laundering' in a
dictionary."). So without further ado, Money laundering is "[t]he act of transferring illegally obtained money
through legitimate people or accounts so that its original source cannot be traced." Black's Law Dictionary
(Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
254. Valasek, supra n. 218, at 765.
255. Benjamin B. Nelson, Student Author, Regulation or Prohibition? The Troubled Legal Status of Internet
Gambling Casinos in the United States in the Wake of the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006, 9 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 39, 64 (2007).
256. Alexander, supra n. 15, at 39.
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authorities. 257 These reputable companies have been replaced in some cases by
companies that actively participate in money laundering.258 Under a regulatory scheme,
the government could make policies that successfully address money laundering
mandatory. 259 Furthermore, companies that facilitated money laundering would be
unable to obtain a license. 260
4. Fraud
Because players cannot actually see the dice rolling or the roulette wheel spinning,
the need for integrity within the Internet gambling industry is paramount.261 While
regulation could address fraudulent practices, the market already provides a significant
incentive for companies to avoid fraud.262 Because gamblers can choose between
thousands of gambling sites, a site that "loaded the dice"263 or refused to pay out
winnings would not remain in the market for long.264 Information about gambling
websites is widely disseminated through watchdog sites and message boards. 265
Regulation could supplement these market forces by requiring licensed sites to maintain
financial reserves sufficient to pay winning bets and mandating odds authentication
software. 266
C. Which Regulatory Scheme Will Best Serve U.S. Interests in Internet Gambling?
Because a regulatory scheme can address the problems presented by Internet
gambling more effectively than the attempted prohibition scheme established by the
UIGEA, 267 Congress should implement the regulatory scheme that best provides an
additional revenue stream for the government while also ensuring that Internet gambling
does not encourage underage gambling, problem gambling, money laundering, or
fraud.268 Scholars have suggested many different regulatory schemes, which generally
257. Neteller, Security, https://merchant.neteller.com/security.html (last accessed Nov. 13, 2008).
258. Alexander, supra n. 15, at 146.
259. The prevention of money laundering in Internet gambling is one of the primary objectives of the U.K.'s
Gambling Act 2005 and licensees must have procedures in place to deter money laundering. See Gambling Act
2005 pt. 1.1 ("In this Act a reference to the licensing objectives is a reference to the objectives of preventing
gambling from being a source of crime or disorder, being associated with crime or disorder or being used to
support crime . . . ."); Gambling Commn., supra n. 193, at 26-27 (licensees must "establish procedures of
internal control and communication to prevent money laundering.").
260. See e.g. Gambling Commn., supra n. 193, at 26-27.
261. See Interactive Gaming Council, Code of Conduct, http://www.igcouncil.org/content/view/20/37/ (last
accessed Nov. 14, 2008) ("To enhance customer confidence in gaming integrity, IGC Members agree to make
every reasonable effort to ensure their systems, algorithms and practices perform in the manner intended and as
portrayed to the customer.").
262. See Owens, supra n. 131, at 98.
263. While this is a concern for online casinos that provide games where gamblers play against the house, it
is not an issue for poker sites because there players compete against themselves while the site takes a fixed
percentage of the pot. See e.g. PokerStars, supra n. 77. Thus, in the words of Doc Holliday in the film
Tombstone, "I said poker's an honest trade. Only suckers buck the tiger. The odds are all with the house."
Tombstone (Hollywood Pictures 1993) (motion picture).
264. See Owens, supra n. 131, at 98.
265. Id. at 99.
266. Valasek, supra n. 218, at 766.
267. For a detailed discussion, see supra pt. III(B).
268. Many scholars who have proposed regulatory schemes for Internet gambling cite the ability of their
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either call for self-regulation by the Internet gambling industry269 or some type of
governmental regulation. 2 70
1. Self-regulation by the Internet Gambling Industry
Under a self-regulatory scheme, the Internet gambling industry would create a
governing body to serve in the place of a government agency.271 The Internet gambling
industry has already established two organizations that could serve in this capacity: E-
Commerce and Online Gaming Regulation and Assurance,272 and the Interactive
Gaming Council. 273 Proponents of self-regulation argue that because Internet gambling
has a global presence, one individual nation cannot effectively regulate it.274 They also
argue that the market effectively discourages Internet gambling fraud without the aid of
governmental regulation.275 Furthermore, many nations have outdated gambling laws 276
and a self-regulatory scheme could ensure that Internet gambling regulations reflect
current technology. 277
While the Internet gambling industry should be praised for its self-regulatory
efforts, some form of governmental regulation is needed to legitimize the industry and
fully protect players.278 Currently, industry organizations attempting to regulate the
Internet gambling industry rely on voluntary compliance, and the most severe
punishment that an organization can inflict on a company is the removal of its seal of
approval.279 Furthermore, some scholars note that under a self-regulatory scheme, an
schemes to address some or all of these factors. See e.g. Miller, supra n. 42, at 216-220; Valasek, supra n. 218,
at 761-767, 772-773; Owens, supra n. 131, at 98-100.
269. See e.g. Owens, supra n. 131, at 98-100.
270. See e.g. Ryan S. Landes, Student Author, Layovers and Cargo Ships: The Prohibition of Internet
Gambling anda Proposed System ofRegulation, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 913, 936-943 (2007); Nicholas M. Wajda,
Student Author, Over-playing a Weak Hand: Why Giving Individual States a Choice Is a Better Bet for Internet
Gambling in the United States, 29 Thomas Jefferson L. Rev. 313, 313-314 (2007); Valasek, supra n. 218, at
777-784.
271. See Owens, supra n. 131, at 98-100.
272. The stated purpose of this organization is to ensure "proper and transparent monitoring of approved
online casinos and poker rooms." E-Commerce and Online Gaming Reg. and Assurance, Welcome to
eCOGRA.org, http://www.ecogra.org/default.aspx?OP=P (last accessed Oct. 28, 2009). Members must comply
with "Generally Accepted Practices" that address underage gambling, problem gambling, fair play, and money
laundering prevention. E-Commerce and Online Gaming Reg. and Assurance, Generally Accepted Practices-
Casinos, Poker, Bingo & Sportsbook, http://www.ecogra.org/egap.aspx?Page-=1&OP=O (last accessed Oct. 28,
2009). The organization also provides dispute mediation for players and member sites. E-Commerce and
Online Gaming Reg. and Assurance, Dispute Resolutions, http://www.ecogra.org/dispute.aspx?Page=1&OP=P
(last accessed Oct. 28, 2009).
273. The Interactive Gaming Council has also established a code of conduct and provides voluntary
mediation for members. Interactive Gaming Council, Interactive Gaming Council, http://www.igcouncil.org/
(last accessed Oct. 28, 2009).
274. See Owens, supra n. 131, at 96.
275. See id. at 98-99.
276. See id. at 95.
277. See id. at 100; see generally Valasek, supra n. 218, at 777-779.
278. See Scoolidge, supra n. 226, at 261-262 ("The industry recognizes the need for government regulation
if it is to attain the same level of legitimacy enjoyed by traditional casinos in reputable jurisdictions."); Keith
Furlong, Gaming Continues as an Internet Success Story, Despite Obstructions from the US. Government: The
Industry Uses Self-Regulation to Fill the Void Left by Governmental Inaction, 9 Gaming L. Rev. 211, 213
(2005) ("Government regulation is the only way to move the Internet gaming industry, as a subset of
eCommerce in general, to the next level of legitimacy.").
279. Scoolidge, supra n. 226, at 261.
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industry's self-interest is often given priority over public concerns.280 While Internet
gambling companies need to instill consumer confidence in order to be profitable, this
incentive may not sufficiently ensure effective self-regulation. 28 1 The Internet gambling
industry desperately needs to inspire more consumer confidence, as 55% of Internet
gamblers believe that online casinos may find ways to cheat players.282 Governmental
regulation could inspire more confidence in the fairness of the Internet gambling
industry. 283 Even the Interactive Gaming Council realizes that it alone cannot
sufficiently regulate online gambling: "Rather than allow the industry to continue in
uncharted territory, regulation is needed to protect players, instill confidence and to
potentially create a new revenue source."284 Finally, while having the appearance of a
financially prudent practice, some scholars assert that self-regulation imposes a greater
financial burden on taxpayers than governmental regulation. 285
2. Governmental Regulation
Congress should be as careful in implementing a regulatory scheme as it was
careless in passing the UIGEA. 286 As stated above, the UIGEA passed as a rider to the
Safe Port Act, a crucial national security bill.287 Congress did not debate the merits of
the UIGEA, and some members of Congress did not even know that it was part of the
act.288 In contrast, the U.K.'s decision to regulate Internet gambling was the product of
six years of research and debate.289 The government issued multiple reports on the
feasibility, benefits, and disadvantages of regulating the Internet gambling industry.2 90
Both Parliament and the general public extensively debated the issue before the
government finally decided to regulate the industry. 291 Congress should take a similar
approach in implementing a regulatory scheme. In fact, in 2007, Rep. Shelley Berkley
(D. Nev.) attempted to begin research into the Internet gambling industry through the
280. See e.g. Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 Duke. L.J. 389, 427-430 (2003)
("The regulatory standards produced by the self-regulatory body are likely to reflect the interests of the
industry it is regulating.").
281. See id. at 430 (discussing fraudulent practices in self-regulated stock markets, Shapiro concludes that
"these events do suggest that self-regulation is not to be trusted, even in industries where public confidence is
important to the sales of their products").
282. Am. Gaming Assn., State of the States 2006: The AGA Survey of Casino Entertainment 27 (Am.
Gaming Assn. 2006) (available at http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/2006 Survey forWeb.pdf)
(finding that 15% of Internet gamblers strongly agreed and 40% somewhat agreed with the following
statement: "I believe that online casinos find ways to cheat people").
283. A study conducted by the International Gaming Institute at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas found
that if Internet gambling was licensed and regulated, it would engender more trust in some Internet gamblers.
See Bo J. Bernhard, Anthony F. Lucas & Elena Shampaner, Internet Gambling in Nevada 5 (U. Nev. Las
Vegas 2007) (available at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdfligingcb intemet gamingnvfinalrpt.pdf).
284. Interactive Gaming Council, IGC Urges Australia to Regulate, http://www.igcouncil.org/content/view/
115/99/ (Apr. 23, 2003).
285. See Shapiro, supra n. 280, at 426 ("In most instances, the costs associated with these properties are
likely to exceed any savings that an agency gains by employing self-regulation.").
286. Cf Barack Obama, My Plan for Iraq, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14obama.html (July
14, 2008) ("As I've said many times, we must be as careful getting out of Iraq as we were careless getting in.").
287. Rose, supra n. 22, at 1.
288. Id
289. See Rohsler & Conlon, supra n. 171, at 227.
290. See e.g. Gambling Rev. Body, supra n. 172, at 165; Safe Bet, supra n. 174, at 6.
291. See Rohsler & Conlon, supra n. 171, at 227.
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Internet Gambling Study Act. 29 2 This act would have commissioned the National
Academy of Sciences to study the Internet gambling industry and the feasibility of a
regulatory scheme.29 3 While Congress failed to pass this bill,294 it should thoroughly
research any regulatory scheme before adopting it, as the UIGEA demonstrates the folly
of passing legislation without sufficient knowledge of the Internet gambling industry.29 5
Congress should begin its research into the Internet gambling industry by studying
how the U.K. regulates the industry.296 The U.K. approach is admirable because it
safeguards against the potential problems associated with Internet gambling: underage
gambling, problem gambling, money laundering, and fraud.297 Early studies suggest that
this approach has been successful at least in curbing problem gambling, as the number of
problem gamblers in the U.K. did not increase from 1999 to 2007.298 Furthermore, with
170 applicants seeking an Internet gambling license and the accompanying 15% tax
rate,299 the U.K. stands to substantially increase its tax revenue through regulation. 300
While many Internet gambling companies have sought a license from the U.K., 30 1
the large, established Internet gambling companies have not sought a license because the
"White List" program ensures that they can market to British gamblers while remaining
licensed in their tax-friendly nations.302 The Gambling Act of 2005 authorizes Internet
gambling companies licensed by nations in the European Economic Area (EEA) to
advertise in the U.K. 30 3 Under the White List program, non-EEA countries may apply
for consideration as an EEA nation so that Internet gambling companies licensed by
these countries can also advertise in the U.K. 304 The Secretary of State may accept these
applications upon a showing that the country regulates gambling "in order to protect
children and vulnerable people from being harmed or exploited; to keep crime out; and
to ensure that gambling is conducted fairly." 305 The country must also "have the
facilities and resources in place to ensure compliance and enforcement with those values
292. H.R. 2140 110th Cong. §§ 1-3 (May 3, 2007).
293. Id. at § 3.
294. Govtrack.us, H.R. 2140: Internet Gambling Study Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h 10-2140 (last accessed Oct. 30, 2009).
295. See Rose, supra n. 22, at 1.
296. See Blankenship, supra n. 183, at 512 ("The United States could create a commission similar to the
Gambling Commission to oversee the licensing of Internet gambling operators. In this way, the United States
could benefit from financial collection and regulatory credibility."); Goldfine & Kintner, supra n. 132, at 103
("A good example of a national regulatory approach is the UK's Gambling Act that was enacted in 2007 and
makes it legal for its citizens to gamble online.").
297. See Gambling Commn., supra n. 193, at 9-11, 26-39.
298. See Gambling Survey, supra n. 200, at 10.
299. Scott Longley, Gambling Commission 'Surprised' As Remote License Count Tops 170,
http://www.gamblingcompliance.com/node/13808 (Apr. 29, 2008).
300. See Goldfine & Kintner, supra n. 132, at 103.
301. Longley, supra n. 299.
302. See Simon Bowers, Online Gambler Seeks UK. Licence, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/
2008/feb/08/gambling.bodog (Feb. 8, 2008) ("Almost all of the other online casino and poker groups targeting
British punters have chosen to boycott the UK regulatory regime because of the 15% remote gaming tax
imposed last year by the Treasury."). For your information, "punter" is a British term for a gambler. See
Merriam-Webster, Punter, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/punter (last accessed Oct. 27, 2009).
303. Gambling Act 2005 pt. 16.331.
304. Dept. for Media, Culture, & Sport, Gambling Act 2005: "Whitelisting" 1.1 (Dept. for Media. Culture, &
Sport 2007) (available at http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/WhiteListingCriteria.pdf).
305. Id. at 1.17.
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and the regulatory regime in operation." 306 Thus far, the Secretary of State has
"whitelisted" Antigua and Barbuda, Alderney, the Isle of Man, and Tasmania. 30 7 A
company licensed in a White List country has little incentive to seek a U.K. license. 308
For example, PokerStars is licensed in the Isle of Man, which has a 1.5% duty and no
corporation tax.309 Because the Isle of Man is on the White List, PokerStars is free to
advertise to British gamblers while avoiding the 15% tax rate imposed by the U.K. 3 10
The U.S. must learn from the U.K.'s mistakes and employ methods that prevent
Internet gambling companies from profiting from U.S. players without a government
license. 3 11 First, Congress should ban all non-licensed Internet gambling companies
from advertising in the U.S. 312 This ban is feasible because the U.S. Justice Department
already prohibits all Internet gambling advertisements. 3 13 It recently collected $31.5
million in fines from Microsoft, Yahoo, and Google for promoting Internet gambling. 3 14
While Internet gambling companies currently exploit a loophole in the ban by promoting
a company's "play money" site, which is linked to its "real money" site, Congress could
easily close this loophole for non-licensed companies. 3 15
Internet gambling is a $16 billion a year industry and analysts estimate that half of
the revenue comes from U.S. gamblers. 3 16 Because the U.S. represents such a large part
of the industry, established companies would have a great incentive to become licensed
in the U.S., especially if they could no longer advertise in the U.S. without a license. 3 17
While these companies may claim that U.S. gamblers will continue to play on their sites
306. Id.
307. Pokerpages, Antigua Now on UK White List of Approved Gaming Advertisers,
http://www.pokerpages.com/poker-news/news/antigua-now-on-uk-white-list-of-approved-gaming-advertisers-
31255.htm (Nov. 5, 2008).
308. See generally Pokerpages, UK White List Who Can Advertise is Published-Includes PokerStars,
http://www.pokerpages.com/poker-news/newsluk-white-list-who-can-advertise-is-published--includes-
pokerstars-29905.htm (Aug. I1, 2007) (discussing how companies licensed in countries not on the White List
are considering moving to a White List country rather than seeking a U.K. license).
309. See Isle of Man Gov., Isle of Man Confirmed on UK. White List, http://www.gov.im/lib/news/
dti/isleofmanconfirm.xml (Aug. 9, 2007) ("Any e-Gaming business locating in the Isle of Man can expect not
only full access to the UK market, one of the strongest in Europe, but also the added benefits of 1.5% duty, 0%
corporation tax, [and] a world class telecommunications infrastructure.").
310. Id.
311. If the government cannot persuade or compel Internet gambling companies to seek a license, then
measures designed to protect the public are ineffective. See generally Landes, supra n. 270, at 936-938.
312. Cf Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1151 (West 2008) (requiring a license in order to advertise as a
contractor).
313. Ltr. from John G. Malcolm, Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen. U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Natil. Assn. of Broadcasters,
Advertising for Internet Gambling and Offshore Sportsbooks Operations 1 (June 11, 2003) (available at
http://www.igamingnews.com/articles/files/NAB-letter-030611 .pdf) ("[T]he Department of Justice, as a public
service, would like you to be aware that the entities and individuals placing these [Internet gambling]
advertisements may be violating state and federal laws and that entities and individuals that run and accept such
advertisements may be aiding and abetting these illegal activities.").
314. Associated Press, Internet Giants Settle US. Case on Gambling Ads, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/
12/20/technology/20soft.html? r- l&scp=24&sq-microsoft%20google%20yahoo%20internet/o20gambling&st
=cse (Dec. 20, 2007) ("[T]he Department of Justice has advised that online gambling is illegal in the United
States, and ads to promote it are improper." (quoting a Google spokesperson)).
315. See Chuck Humphrey, Advertising Online Gambling Casinos: Advertising for 'Dot net' Websites,
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/Articles-Notes/advertising-online-casinos.htm (last updated Aug. 6, 2006).
316. Warner, supra n. 16.
317. The fall of PartyGaming's revenues after Congress passed the UIGEA demonstrates the importance of
the U.S. market to Internet gambling companies. See Pajich, supra n. 61.
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even if they were unlicensed, they would be hard pressed to claim that they have a legion
of loyal customers considering that a majority of Internet gamblers believe that these
companies try to cheat players.318 Under the current system, U.S. gamblers do not have a
domestic alternative; however, under a regulatory scheme, they could play on
government licensed sites, which would likely engender more trust than the foreign,
unlicensed sites.3 19 With these incentives for seeking a license in place, the government
can tap in to a substantial new revenue stream.320 For example, a
PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that regulation of Internet gambling could increase
federal revenue by up to $42.8 billion over a ten year period. 32 1
An additional benefit of a governmental regulatory scheme is the boost that it
would give to the ailing financial industry.322 Gamblers use credit cards in roughly 90%
of all transactions with Internet gambling companies.323 Credit card transaction fees cost
Internet gambling companies up to 7.5% per transaction.324 Analysts estimate that based
upon these fees and the size of the U.S. Internet gambling market, financial institutions
stand to gain $420 million in annual revenues from the regulation of Internet
gambling. 32 5 Thus, while the UIGEA requires financial institutions to spend millions of
dollars in an attempt to block restricted transactions,326 regulation will enable financial
institutions to tap into a multi-million dollar market currently dominated by foreign
entities. 327
D. Obstacles to the Implementation ofa Governmental Regulatory Scheme
While Congress has the authority to regulate Internet gambling through the
Commerce Clause,328 states have traditionally regulated gambling through their police
powers.329 Because of this, states vary considerably from one another in the type of
gambling permitted. 330 Two states, Hawaii and Utah, ban all forms of gambling. 33 1
Other states, such as Tennessee, allow only state-sponsored gambling. 332 Finally, some
318. See Am. Gaming Assn., supra n. 282, at 27.
319. See Scoolidge, supra n. 226, at 264 ("[E]-casinos registered in a regulated gambling domain would get
the majority of online gambling patrons.").
320. PricewaterhouseCoopers, Estimate of Federal Revenue Effect of Proposal to Regulate and Tax Online
Gambling 2 (Natl. Econ. Consulting 2007) (available at http://www.safeandsecureig.org/medial
taxestimate.pdf).
321. Id.
322. See Miller, supra n. 42, at 216.
323. Id.
324. Id
325. Id.
326. 73 Fed. Reg. at 69397.
327. See Alexander, supra n. 15, at 39-40.
328. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; see People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844,
862 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) ("[The Interstate Commerce Clause gives Congress the plenary power to regulate illegal
gambling conducted between a location in the United States and a foreign location.").
329. See Kiran S. Raj, Student Author, Drawing a Line in the Sand: How the Federal Government Can Work
with the States to Regulate Internet Gambling, 56 Emory L.J. 777, 780 (2006).
330. Id.
331. Idat781.
332. Id.
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states, such as Nevada, permit virtually all types of gambling. 333 If Congress
implemented a regulatory scheme that treated all states equally, states that ban all other
types of gambling would be forced to permit Internet gambling. 334 Furthermore, states
that rely on state-sponsored gambling for revenue would face competition from Internet
casinos.33 5
In 2007, Rep. Barney Frank (D. Mass.) proposed a regulatory scheme allowing
individual states to decide whether to regulate or prohibit Internet gambling.336 The
scheme also allows states that regulate Internet gambling to place restrictions on it that
go beyond federal regulations. 337 Under this scheme, an Internet gambling company
would establish its businesses in a state that regulated the industry. 338 The company
could accept players from its home state and all other states that allowed Internet
gambling; however, it would be forbidden from accepting funds from residents of states
that banned Internet gambling. 339 The companies could verify a gambler's residence
with the same technology used for age-verification. 340 Under this state-level approach,
states that see Internet gambling as a danger could protect their residents through
prohibition, while other states that see it as a potential revenue source could regulate the
industry. 34 1
There are several problems with a state level approach to Internet gambling. 34 2
First, since some states would ban Internet gambling, an Internet gambling license would
have less value because the number of potential gamblers would be much lower. 34 3
Furthermore, a state level approach to regulation runs the risk of creating a "race to the
bottom" effect where states regulate and tax to the least extent possible in order to attract
Internet gambling companies. 344 This race to the bottom would work against one of the
purposes of regulating Internet gambling by reducing the protections afforded to Internet
gamblers. 345 Also, the rationale for state regulation of land-based gambling does not
333. Id. at 782.
334. See generally Landes, supra n. 270, at 927-943 (proposing a regulatory system that allows Internet
gambling nationwide without exempting states that ban all types of gambling).
335. See generally id.
336. H.R. 2046, 110th Cong. § 5385(a) (Apr. 24, 2007). This bill died in committee. Govtrack.us, H.R.
2046: The Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=h 10-2046 (last updated Nov. 6, 2008).
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id
340. See Raj, supra n. 329, at 808-809.
341. See generally id at 812-813.
342. Infra nn. 343-350 and accompanying text.
343. Washington, Illinois, South Dakota, Louisiana, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, and Oregon already ban
Internet gambling. Mark B. Dubnoff, State Bans on Internet Gambling May Be Unconstitutional, 12 Gaming L.
Rev. & Econ. 207, 213-214 (2008).
344. Cf David M. Konisky, Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the
Bottom? 51 Am. J. Political Sci. 853, 853 (2007) ("In the U.S. context, critics of decentralization argue that
states are primarily concerned with economic development, and, when faced with interstate competition for
mobile capital, they will relax their environmental regulation to gain an advantage over other states.").
345. See e.g. Gambling Act 2005 § 1.1 ("In this Act a reference to the licensing objectives is a reference to
the objectives of protecting children and other vulnerable persons from being harmed or exploited by
gambling.").
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apply to Internet gambling. 346 States need to regulate land-based casinos because they
affect both gamblers and non-gamblers.347 For example, if a state could not control
where a company builds a casino through zoning laws and building permits, the
construction of a casino in an inappropriate area could cause traffic jams and negatively
affect home values in the area. 348 In contrast, Internet gambling takes place in the
privacy of one's home and thus does not evoke the same rationale for state regulation. 349
Finally, some scholars argue that state bans of Internet gambling violate the
Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause when the state allows similar land-based
gambling because the bans favor "in-state economic interests over out-of-state economic
interests." 350 Because of these reasons, the federal government, rather than the states,
should regulate Internet gambling. 35 1
The gaming interests of Indian tribes represent another obstacle to a regulatory
scheme.352 In 2006, revenue from Indian gaming exceeded $25 billion and the industry
employed 670,000 people, 75% of whom were Indian. 353 Congress regulates Indian
gaming through the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 354 The IGRA divides Indian
gaming activities into three classes. 355 Tribes have exclusive control over Class. I
gaming, which involves games played between tribal members for small prizes.356 Class
II gaming includes bingo and non-casino card games. 357 Tribes are free to conduct these
activities without state interference as long as the state does not completely ban the
activity. 358 Class III gaming includes casino style games such as blackjack, roulette, and
craps. 359 In order to offer Class III gaming, a tribe must enter into a compact with the
state in which the tribe is located.360 The IGRA prohibits states from taxing Indian
gaming;361 however, the U.S Department of the Interior has approved compacts that
provide for revenue sharing between states and tribes in exchange for exclusivity in
providing the gaming activity.362 For example, Oklahoma created a State-Tribal Gaming
346. See generally Eric B. Becker, Student Author, Slots in the City: A Critical Look at the Balance of
Decision-Making Power in Gaming Legislation, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1033, 1050-1055 (2008). (discussing
reasons states may choose to regulate land-based gaming and the ramifications such decisions can have
locally).
347. See generally id
348. See generally id.
349. See Scoolidge, supra n. 226, at 252.
350. Dubnoff, supra n. 343, at 207.
351. See generally Landes, supra n. 270, at 927-943 (proposing a regulatory system on the federal level
rather than the state level).
352. See generally I. Nelson Rose & Martin D. Owens, Internet Gaming Law 161-175 (Mary Ann Liebert,
Inc. 2005).
353. Natl. Indian Gaming Assn., Indian Gaming Facts, http://www.indiangaming.org/info/pr/press-releases-
2007/NIGAecon impact 2006.pdf (last accessed Oct. 28, 2009).
354. See Rose & Owens, supra n. 352, at 164-165.
355. See id.
356. See id at 164; Jeffrey A. Dempsey, Surfing for Wampum: Federal Regulation of Internet Gambling and
Native American Sovereignty, 25 Am. Indian L. Rev. 133, 144 (2001).
357. See Dempsey, supra n. 356, at 144.
358. See Rose & Owens, supra n. 352, at 164-165.
359. See id at 165.
360. See id
361. See Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 Nev. L.J. 285, 291 (2004).
362. See Katie Eidson, Student Author, Will States Continue to Provide Exclusivity in Tribal Gaming
Compacts or Will Tribes Bust on the Hand of the State in Order to Expand Indian Gaming, 29 Am. Indian L.
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Act that gives Oklahoma tribes total exclusivity for card games.363 However, it appears
that this exclusivity arrangement does not apply to the Internet, because Internet
gambling is illegal in Oklahoma, according to the official opinion of the Oklahoma
Attorney General. 364
Rep. Barney Frank's proposed regulatory scheme addresses the issue of Indian
gaming by allowing each Indian tribe to decide whether to regulate or prohibit Internet
gambling.36 5 Furthermore, tribes that choose to allow Internet gambling could place
extra restrictions on the industry above and beyond federal regulations.366 Companies
that violate these tribal regulations could have their licenses revoked, or even face
criminal liability.367 This approach to Indian gaming places a tremendous burden on
Internet gambling companies. 368 There are 562 federally-recognized Indian tribes in the
U.S.369 Since each tribe could make its own Internet gambling regulations, companies
would have to comply with up to 562 different regulatory schemes depending on a
gambler's residence. 3 70
Congress should not adopt this onerous approach, but instead should allow tribes
to compete in the Internet gambling market. 37 1 Indian tribes would have an advantage in
the Internet gambling industry because of their years of gaming experience. 37 2 Over the
years, tribes have built up a loyal cadre of customers who would likely prefer to gamble
online with the same entity that operates their preferred brick-and-mortar casino.373
Participation in the Internet gambling industry, where location is not a factor, would also
benefit tribes located in remote areas who have been unable to successfully run casinos
because of their distance from major population areas. 3 74 Finally, Internet gambling
should not harm the tribe's existing gaming operations considering that in a 2007 study,
four out of five Internet gamblers said that gambling online did not affect their gambling
in brick-and-mortar casinos.375
IV. CONCLUSION
Internet gambling is a $16 billion a year industry and analysts estimate that half of
Rev. 319, 326 (2004).
363. See id at 328-329.
364. See Okla. Atty. Gen. Op. 02-25 (June 26, 2002) (available at http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/
deliverdocument.asp?id-406357&hits-).
365. H.R. 2046, 1 10th Cong. at § 5385(b).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See generally id.
369. See Natl. Indian Gaming Assn., supra n. 353.
370. See H.R. 2046, 110th Cong. at § 5385(b).
371. See generally Dempsey, supra n. 356, at 151.
372. For example, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation began its gaming operation in 1986 and now
operates one of the largest casinos in the world, the Foxwoods Resort Casino. Foxwoods Resort Casino, About
Foxwoods, http://www.foxwoods.com/AboutFoxwoods/ (last accessed Nov. 29, 2008).
373. See e.g. id. ("More than 40,000 guests visit Foxwoods each day."); see generally Landes, supra n. 270,
at 938 (discussing how gamblers would be drawn to Internet casinos established by reputable brick-and-mortar
casinos).
374. See Rose & Owens, supra n. 352, at 171.
375. See Bernhard, Lucas, & Shampaner, supra n. 283, at 3.
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the revenue comes from U.S. gamblers.376 Instead of regulating and taxing this lucrative
industry, Congress has pursued a policy of prohibition through the UIGEA.37 7 However,
the UIGEA has failed to stop Internet gambling and instead has only driven reputable
companies out of the industry.378 Furthermore, the rules promulgated by the Federal
Reserve System will not strengthen the UIGEA because they leave too many loopholes
Internet gambling companies can exploit. 379 Thus, under the current system, the Internet
gambling industry uses the U.S. as its primary revenue source and leaves the government
to address the problems associated with Internet gambling without any revenue from the
industry. 380
Instead of pursuing a fruitless effort to prohibit Internet gambling, the U.S. should
follow the U.K's lead by regulating and taxing the Internet gambling industry. 38 1
Regulation effectively addresses the potential problems associated with Internet
gambling: underage gambling, problem gambling, money laundering, and fraud. 382
Moreover, governmental regulation has the potential to add millions of dollars to both
the tax coffers and the national economy.383 While issues remain concerning state and
tribal interests, regulation is the most effective way for the U.S. to address Internet
gambling. 384
Ross A. Crutchfield
376. Warner, supra n. 16.
377. For a description of the UIGEA, see supra pt. II(C), and for an analysis of the UIGEA, see supra pt.
III(A).
378. See supra pt. H(D) for a discussion of the effect of the UIGEA on the Internet gambling industry.
379. For a description of these rules, see supra pt. II(C), and for an analysis of these rules, see supra pt.
II(A).
380. Supra pt. III(A)-(B) details the problems that accompany Internet gambling.
381. Supra pt. II(H) describes the U.K.'s regulatory scheme, while supra pt. HI(C)(2) discusses the merits
and disadvantages of the scheme.
382. For a detailed analysis of each of these problems, see supra pt. m(B)(l)-(4).
383. For a discussion of the steps that the U.S. will need to take to ensure that a regulatory scheme provides
a reliable stream of tax revenue, see supra pt. Ill(C)(2).
384. Supra pt. III(D) details potential obstacles that must be overcome in order for Congress to implement a
regulatory scheme.
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